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Abstract 
  This paper asks how the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 
(ASEAN’s) Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 (AEC2015) will affect industries in 
Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki. First, ASEAN’s rapid economic during the past five decades 
has made ASEAN a large market for Japanese goods, services, and firms. ASEAN has 
supported this growth by facilitating important economic and political dialogue in Southeast 
Asia and AEC2015 will likely reinforce this important role. Second, although ASEAN has 
made efforts to promote economic integration among member economies and AEC2015 is 
another step in this direction, substantial barriers to intra-ASEAN transactions remain and 
will persist after AEC2015. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was initiated in 1992 and 
facilitated elimination of tariffs on most intra-ASEAN trade by 2010, but the share of 
intra-ASEAN trade remains relatively low at about one-quarter of all ASEAN trade and has 
not changed much since 2005. Most importantly, like AFTA, AEC2015 is not likely to 
increase preferential margins for intra-ASEAN trade, largely because ASEAN retains strong 
comparative advantages with respect to major external trading partners and firms in ASEAN 
are deeply involved in region- or world-wide production networks. Third, despite 
proclamations that AEC2015 marks the advent of a “single” ASEAN market, progress toward 
achieving most of AEC2015’s specific goals is likely to be slow, especially with respect to 
key non-tariff barriers and restrictions on trade in services. Fourth, Japan’s multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in ASEAN are likely to be the largest conduit through which AEC2015 
affects Japan, Kitakyushu, and Shimonoseki. To the extent that AEC2015 affects Japan, 
Kitakyushu, and Shimonoseki, AEC2015 is likely to affect Japan’s services’ industries such as 
trading, logistics (trade, transportation, and communication), and business services, more than 
commonly appreciated. The proliferation of production networks in machinery industries, 
which are the source of most of Japan’s gross exports, is a major reason for this.  
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1. Introduction and Summary 
This paper attempts to answer one apparently simple question: how will the formation of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN’s) Economic Community (AEC) in 
2015, often known as AEC2015, affect industries in Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki, and what 
are the implications of AEC2015 for firms and local governments in the region? An intelligent 
guess at the answer question requires consideration of at least four dimensions of ASEAN’s 
economic and political performance and ASEAN’s interaction with Japan.  
First, ASEAN’s economies were relatively small and most were poor when ASEAN was 
founded in 1967. Because most of them have grown rapidly in the following decades, ASEAN 
is now an important market for Japanese goods, services, and firms. Section 2 emphasizes that 
ASEAN’s rapid growth has probably been the single most important reason for increased 
interaction between Japan and ASEAN. The persistence of strong comparative advantages, or 
the ability of ASEAN economies to cheaply produce goods and services which are relatively 
expensive to produce in Japan, and vice versa, is another important cause. In recent years, the 
proliferation of production networks, which are facilitated the ability to segment production 
of certain goods and services into resource-intensive, labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and 
knowledge-intensive stages, is yet another factor connecting ASEAN, Japan, and other 
economies in the region (e.g., China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan). ASEAN the institution 
has also facilitated important economic and political dialogue in Southeast Asia, which in turn 
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contributed to decades of relative peace and open economic policies, which were key reasons 
for ASEAN’s relatively rapid growth.  
Second, although ASEAN has made important efforts to promote economic integration 
among member economies and AEC2015 is another important step in this direction, 
substantial barriers to intra-ASEAN transactions remain and will likely persist after AEC2015 
(Section 3). The most substantial step toward formal integration was the agreement to form 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and its gradual implementation. By 2010 most 
tariffs on goods imported from other ASEAN members were eliminated, but the share of 
intra-ASEAN trade remains relatively low at about one-quarter of all ASEAN trade and has 
not changed much since 2005. Although casual observation might suggest that AFTA has 
therefore been relatively ineffective at promoting intra-regional trade, more sophisticated 
analyses suggest AFTA has promoted intra-regional trade to some degree, though its effects 
have been relatively small. Most importantly, AFTA has not substantially weakened ASEAN’s 
comparative advantages with respect to major external trading partners, and if anything, 
strengthened production networks involving ASEAN. Thus, transactions with major external 
partners remain relatively large.  
Third, Section 4 details the relatively slow progress of AEC-related negotiations. In short, 
despite proclamations that AEC2015 marks the advent of a “single” ASEAN market, progress 
toward achieving most of AEC2015’s specific goals is likely to be slow. AEC2015 is in many 
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ways a natural continuation of the AFTA process, and most AEC-related negotiations have 
focused on removing substantial non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and other measures designed to 
reduce intra-ASEAN transactions costs. However, these negotiations have made relatively 
slow progress in removing several key, remaining barriers and, the advent of AEC2015 is 
unlikely to increase preference margins for intra-regional transactions. AEC2015 will thus 
have a relatively weak influence on transactions in ASEAN, especially when compared to 
similar efforts in the European Union or the North American Free Trade Area, for example. 
Moreover, negotiations about many key elements of AEC2015, especially removal of NTBs 
and barriers to trade in services, are likely to proceed slowly, with substantive agreements and 
implementation occurring after 2015. 
Fourth, Section 5 emphasizes the important roles of Japan’s multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in ASEAN and transactions between Japan and ASEAN, arguing that Japan’s MNEs 
are likely to be the largest conduit through which AEC2015 affects Japan, Kitakyushu, and 
Shimonoseki. To the extent that AEC2015 affects Japan, Kitakyushu, and Shimonoseki, the 
section also emphasizes that AEC2015 is likely to affect Japan’s services’ industries such as 
trading, logistics (trade, transportation, and communication), and business services, more than 
commonly appreciated. The proliferation of production networks in machinery industries, 
which are the source of most of Japan’s gross exports, is a major reason for this. Finally, 
section 6 briefly reviews the conclusions of the study and offers a few suggestions about how 
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firms and policy makers in Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki might best help the region’s 
industries take advantage of the opportunities AEC2015 is likely to present.  
 
2. Recent Trends in ASEAN Economies and Their Interaction with Japan 
ASEAN was originally founded in 1967 by five economies, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, and four relatively poor 
economies (often referred to as CLMV economies: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) 
joined in 1995-1999. In 1967, ASEAN economies were relatively small and poor, but most of 
them grew rapidly in the subsequent 25 years. By 1995, the 10 ASEAN economies had a 
combined GDP, a common measure of economic size, that was 12% of Japan’s GDP if 
measured in current US$, and 2/3 of Japan’s if measured at purchasing-power-parity (Table 1). 
Per capita GDP, a common measure of living standards, remained substantially lower than in 
Japan in 1995 if measured in U.S. dollars (e.g., 59% of Japanese levels in Singapore, 10% in 
Malaysia, 7% in Thailand, and 1% each in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, Table 2). If 
evaluated at purchasing power parity, per capita GDP was substantially higher relative to 
Japan’s in all ASEAN economies, and Singapore’s per capita GDP exceeded Japan’s by 43%.1 
After decades of relatively good performance, many ASEAN economies contracted 
                                                  
1 Although any measure of living standards is imprecise, the difference between the US$ and purchasing power 
parity calculations primarily reflect the fact that many non-traded items (especially services) are substantially 
cheaper in ASEAN economies than in Japan, which means that the same amount of US$ income can buy more in 
ASEAN economies than in Japan. 
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sharply after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 (Tables 1, 2). Contractions were largest in 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, where real GDP measured in local currency fell 13%, 11%, 
and 7.4%, respectively.2 Growth was also negative in Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore 
(International Monetary Fund 2014). Further external shocks related to the dot.com crash led 
to and slowdown of GDP growth to under 1% in Malaysia and Singapore in 2001, and the 
world financial crisis led to similar or larger slowdowns in Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand in 2009. On top of these cyclical problems, structural issues are also 
thought to have contributed to reduced long-term growth in many of the region’s economies.  
Nonetheless, by 2015, ASEAN is projected to have grown to over half (55%) of Japan’s 
size if measured in current US$ or over one-third (38%) larger than Japan if measured at 
purchasing power parity (Table 1). Although recent growth has been relatively slow compared 
to their performance during the boom preceding the Asian financial crisis or the recent 
performance of China, ASEAN economies have grown more rapidly than most economies 
worldwide during 1995-2015 (International Monetary Fund 2014c). Thus, ASEAN is now 
large market for Japanese products, services, and firms. And although ASEAN economies 
face many challenges, the ASEAN market is likely to continue growing relatively rapidly for 
many years to come, unless growth is interrupted by a prolonged war, for example.  
Reflecting the effects of the Asian financial crisis and the dot.com shock, the US$ value 
                                                  
2 The growth rate of real GDP in domestic currency is the most common measure of economic performance 
over time in individual economies. 
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of ASEAN’s imports from the world grew relatively slowly (59%) in 1995-2005, but growth 
was much more rapid in 2005-2013 (124%; Table 3). In 1995, China was a much smaller 
import market than ASEAN, but China’s imports grew much more rapidly and in 2005 China 
was a larger import market than ASEAN, though not by much. By 2013, China’s imports 
exceeded ASEAN’s by 50%, while ASEAN’s imports exceeded Japan’s by 57%.  
Imports from Japan grew more slowly than imports from the world in both ASEAN and 
China, but growth was again slower in ASEAN than in China (Table 3). ASEAN’s imports 
from Japan shrank in 1995-2005, partially because the financial crises reduced demand for 
many machinery items such as autos and factory equipment, which are among Japan’s largest 
exports. Thus, between 1995 and 2005, China’s imports from Japan increased from about 1/3 
of ASEAN’s imports from Japan to 1.2-fold their size. In 2005-2013, China continued to be a 
more rapidly growing market for imports from Japan than ASEAN was, but both markets 
grew rapidly, 62% and 45%, respectively. By 2013, imports from Japan amounted to US$41 
billion in Thailand, US$18-20 billion each in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, US$12 
billion in Vietnam, and $5.7 million in the Philippines. These six large economies (hereafter 
the ASEAN-6) accounted for over 98% of ASEAN’s imports from Japan, though imports by 
several of the four smaller economies have grown relatively rapidly in recent years. 
Here it should also be emphasized that ASEAN has provided an important forum for 
economic and political dialogue among its members. This dialogue has in turn made 
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important contributions to open economic policies, conflict resolution, and the maintenance of 
peace, which have been important key necessary conditions for sustained economic growth 
and international trade expansion in ASEAN and elsewhere. Although the extent of ASEAN’s 
contribution to this process is difficult or impossible to measure, it has probably been large in 
the original five ASEAN economies since 1967 and in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam since 
the 1970s or 1980s.  
 
3. AFTA, Intra-ASEAN Economic Transactions, and the Goals of AEC2015 
Although ASEAN was founded in 1967, it made relatively little progress toward formal 
economic integration until the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established by a 1992 
agreement signed by the six older, richer ASEAN economies. The CLMV economies joined 
AFTA in 1995-1999, but these poorer economies have been allowed to pursue a somewhat 
slower pace of import liberalization than the older, richer six. According to a recent evaluation 
by the ASEAN Secretariat and the World Bank (2013, pp. 1-8), Singapore and Brunei have 
complete eliminated tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade. Indonesia, Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, 
the Philippines and Thailand have eliminated most tariffs on imports from other AFTA 
members, except on few other products not subject to liberalization under the ASEAN Trade 
in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which was signed in 2009 and designed to strengthen the legal 
foundations of AFTA. As a result, the average intra-ASEAN tariff for the six older members 
10 
 
was only 0.05% in 2012, which compares favorably with other customs unions and free-trade 
areas. The CLMV economies also made large reductions in intra-regional tariffs, their 
intra-ASEAN average declining from 7.3% in 2000 to 2.1% in 2010-2012.  
Although preferential tariffs declined to low levels and the value of intra-regional trade 
expanded rapidly (Figure 1, Table 3), the share of intra-regional trade remained relatively low 
at 25-26% of exports or 22-24% of imports in 2005-2013. Casual observers often point to the 
relatively low level of intra-ASEAN shares as evidence that AFTA has been relatively 
ineffective. However, this simplistic view is naïve because it ignores other factors that 
determine the direction and composition of trade flows, and several more sophisticated 
studies (Bun et al. 2009; Elliot and Ikemoto 2004; Nguyen 2009; Okabe and Urata 2014) 
suggest that AFTA has made relatively small contributions to intra-regional trade in ASEAN. 
One of the most important reasons for the low levels of intra-regional trade shares is the 
fact that ASEAN economies supply large import partners in high-income markets such as 
Europe, Japan, and North America with relatively large amounts of resource- and 
labor-intensive products such as apparel, footwear, rubber products, plastics, and electronic 
parts, while those partners are important sources of chemicals and capital goods such as 
factory machinery, core components of electronic products, and motor vehicles and key parts 
like engines. In short, ASEAN and several its major extra-regional trading partners have 
strong comparative advantages relative to each other, leading to low intra-regional shares.  
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A second reason is increasing reliance on China, both as a source of imports and as an 
export market, which mainly results from China’s relatively rapid economic growth. Another 
cause is the proliferation of production networks involving substantial trade in intermediate 
products among ASEAN and Chinese suppliers, which are often used in final products sold in 
advanced markets such as Europe, Japan, and North America (Asia-Pacific Research and 
Training Network on Trade, ed., 2011). It is thus important to emphasize that both extra- and 
intra-regional trade has grown rapidly in recent years, and that the growth of trade has been 
largely consistent with the evolution of comparative advantage and production networks. 
A third reason for low intra-ASEAN shares is that preferential tariff schemes are not 
heavily utilized by ASEAN traders. This results first and foremost because multilateral 
(most-favored nation or MFN) non-agricultural tariffs are quite low (Table 4).3 For example, 
in 2004 and 2012, over four-fifths of the value of non-agricultural imports in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore incurred low tariffs of 5% or less. Thailand had the 
highest MFN tariffs of the original five ASEAN members, but the share of imports facing low 
tariffs was almost three-fourths, substantially higher than in China and Vietnam, for example. 
In other words, preferential margins for intra-regional trade are relatively low in AFTA and 
traders have relatively weak price incentives to use intra-regional schemes (ASEAN 
Secretariat and the World Bank 2013, p. 8). Correspondingly, relatively small proportions of 
                                                  
3 Here we focus on non-agricultural tariffs because the value of agricultural goods supplied to ASEAN by 
Japanese firms is small.  
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intra-ASEAN trade utilize preferential tariffs.4 On reason for low utilization rates is that the 
costs of utilizing intra-regional schemes can be substantial, especially for smaller firms with 
little experience in international trade (Wignaraja 2013).  
A fourth cause is the plethora of regulations in ASEAN economies that continue to 
inflate the costs of both intra-regional and extra-regional transactions in a variety of goods, 
services, labor, and capital. Many transactions costs are also inflated by inadequate 
infrastructure and logistics support. Despite substantial reductions of intra-regional tariffs, a 
December 2013 report by the ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2013, p. 22), also says 
import tariffs are “by far the most frequent” harmful measure and the “instrument ASEAN 
governments have resorted to most frequently”, while import-related non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) are “the second most frequently used measure”.5 Thailand in particular was singled 
out for using a large number of NTMs (126), while Indonesia introduced 12 of the 17 new 
NTMs verified by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2011-May 2012 (ASEAN 
Secretariat and World Bank, 2013, p. 26).  
First proposed in 2002 (Hew and Soesastro 2003) and formalized in 2007’s Blueprint 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2008) and 2009’s Roadmap (ASEAN Secretariat 2009), the AEC 
consists of four pillars. The first pillar is to create a “single market and production base”, 
                                                  
4 According to Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich (2015, p. 31), the shares of trade utilizing FTA preferences increase 
from 21% of Thai exports to AEC economies in 2006 to 30-32% in 2009-2010 before falling to 26% in 2012; 
corresponding shares of imports from AEC economies rose from 12-13% in 2006-2008 to 26-27% in 2011-2012. 
5 NTMs are defined as policy measures designed to achieve non-trade related goals, but which affect trade.  
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which facilitates the free intra-regional flows of goods, services, skilled labor, investment, and 
capital, and promotes accelerated liberalization in 12 priority integration sectors as well as 
food, agriculture, and forestry. The AEC’s second pillar is related and aims to reduce 
transactions costs by improving competition policies, consumer protection, intellectual 
property rights, and infrastructure provision. The AEC’s third and fourth pillars, promotion of 
equitable economic development (e.g., by promoting small and medium-sized enterprises) 
and more complete integration into the global economy (mainly through ASEAN’s 
participation in many regional free trade areas), sound more grandiose, but are actually more 
limited in scope.  
 
4. Implementation of AEC2015 and its Likely Effects on ASEAN  
Although the ASEAN Secretariat’s (2012) “scorecard” evaluated progress toward 
realization of specific measures being negotiated under all four pillars of the AEC agreement 
during 2008-2011, the scorecard itself and other studies of AEC2015’s likely effects focus 
primarily on measures under the first pillar and related elements of the second pillar 
(especially infrastructure provision).6 Many specific measures being considered under the 
first pillar, as well as efforts to promote infrastructure development under the second pillar, 
                                                  
6 See ASEAN Secretariat (2013), ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2013), Basu Das (2012, 2013), Basu 
Das et al. (2013), CIMB ASEAN Research Institute (2013), and Intal et al. (2014). 
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are complementary to and a natural extension of AFTA. 7  Correspondingly, the 2012 
scorecard identified 173 specific goals related to the first pillar and 78 goals related to the 
second pillar, but far fewer specific goals related to the third and fourth pillars (12 and 14, 
respectively).  
The 2012 scorecard for 2008-2011 (ASEAN Secretariat 2012) identifies free flows of (a) 
goods, (b) services, (c) investment, and (d) capital, as well as measures to promote (e) 12 
priority integration sectors and (f) food, agriculture, and forestry, as major elements of the 
first pillar. Just under one-third of the specific measures considered under this pillar relate to 
free flows of goods (56), though further reductions of remaining intra-regional tariffs are not 
being considered. Rather many of the specific measures are designed to reduce non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), which are defined as a subset of NTMs that exceed “what is needed to secure 
the measure’s non-trade (often safety, environmental or social) objectives” (ASEAN 
Secretariat and World Bank, 2013, p. 8).8  
Most measures identified as NTBs restrict imports in sectors where governments have 
decided to protect national producers, often at the behest of lobbyists that influence them. 
Other NTBs restrict exports, and there is some taxation of exports as well, though export 
                                                  
7 Improving intellectual property protection is also thought to affect trade facilitation, which is an important goal 
of AEC2015, but this had yet to be an important area of negotiation. 
8 Some studies distinguish NTMs, which are viewed as measures to achieve non-trade related policy goals, and 
NTBs, which are a subset of NTMs. In principle, this distinction is useful, but in practice it is difficult to define 
precisely. For example, when is a product labeling requirement necessary, and when is it excessive? Clearly the 
answers to this and many similar questions are often ambiguous in important respects. 
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taxes and NTBs affecting exports are relatively small and infrequent in ASEAN (ASEAN 
Secretariat and World Bank 2013, pp. 27-30). Free trade areas (FTAs) like ASEAN require 
rules of origin to insure that a certain percentage of imports qualifying for intra-regional trade 
do indeed originate from within the trade area. However, rules of origin can be very 
complicated and improving AFTA’s rules of origin is another important element of AEC’s 
efforts to reduce NTBs. Similarly, the AEC seeks to improve the efficiency of customs 
procedures through the ASEAN Single Window and ASEAN e-customs procedures. 
The 2007 Blueprint identified NTBs as the “main protectionist instrument” (ASEAN 
Secretariat and World Bank, 2013, p. 9) impeding intra-ASEAN trade in many ASEAN 
economies. Negotiations have thus focused on establishing a schedule for the eventual of all 
NTBs affecting intra-ASEAN trade and making remaining NTMs more transparent. However, 
according to a December 2013 report by the ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2013, p. 
10), “there has been little real progress in the elimination … of … NTBs”. The conclusion to 
Austria’s (2013, p. 79) detailed analysis echoes this sentiment, saying “Achievements to date 
have not matched the commitments made in 2009 in the Roadmap for the AEC”, and that 
difficulties in reducing NTBs result from difficulties with (a) “identifying the NTBs from 
among the NTMs”, (b) achieving consensus about how to identify and eliminate NTBs, and 
(c) “supply-side capacity constraints” (e.g., the ability to harmonize standards).  
ASEAN’s efforts to improve trade facilitation and logistics are generally evaluated more 
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favorably than efforts to reduce NTBs (ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank 2013, pp. 44-91). 
Progress has been uneven, but substantial in areas such as the modernization of customs and 
the implementation of national single windows, which will form the basis of the ASEAN 
single window, especially in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Steps toward the 
construction of national single windows are also moving forward in Thailand, Brunei, and 
Vietnam, but progress is slower in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Singapore, with its 
TradeNet system, already has one of the most efficient single windows worldwide and is a 
natural reference country for other ASEAN economies. Measures related to improving 
infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure (39 of the 78 measures identified by ASEAN 
Secretariat 2012), under the second pillar are also numerous and related to trade facilitation, 
but national governments and firms are the main actors in this sphere and the influence of 
AEC2015 is likely to be limited. 
Specific measures relating to the free flows of services constitute another major category 
accounting for about one-fourth (43) of the measures related to the first pillar in the 2012 
scorecard (ASEAN Secretariat 2012). Removal of restrictions on services’ transactions, and 
related restrictions on the movement of skilled labor, has been prioritized. However, as with 
NTBs, there has been little tangible progress (ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank, 2013, pp. 
92-120). Moreover, according Nikomborirak and Jitdumrong (2013, p. 137), “the service 
sector liberalization goals established in the AEC are far from ambitious”, “liberalization 
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parameters specified under the AEC Blueprint are not binding, as they are not subject to the 
dispute settlement mechanism”, and “actual implementation is far behind the milestones 
established in the AEC”. They further conclude that “the AEC is unlikely to make any 
meaningful difference to ASEAN services trade in the foreseeable future” even though “very 
few people recognize this fact and still anticipate a massive tide of cross-border investment 
and movement of labor in 2015”. The fact that many aspects of AEC2015 are not binding and 
the lack a credible dispute mechanism for many disputes are important, fundamental problems 
that affect not only services, but many other areas of AEC2015. 
Measures to promote free movement of investment (mainly foreign direct investment or 
FDI) and capital (mainly portfolio investment) overlap in important respects. Because most 
ASEAN economies now have relatively open investment regimes governing FDI in most 
manufacturing industries, there is substantial overlap between efforts to liberalize restrictions 
on FDI and on trade in services. ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2013, p. 121) identify 
“telecom, electricity and banking” as particularly important inputs affected by FDI restrictions 
in several ASEAN economies. However, because many remaining restrictions are designed to 
protect vested interests, progress on removing restrictions is likely to be slow for the 
foreseeable future. On the other hand, the same study (p. 155) concludes that “Investment 
integration has been progressing quite well in ASEAN, which is driven concurrently by 
ASEAN growing economies and the ASEAN investment integration policy”. It is also clear 
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that ASEAN’s stock and bond markets have become more open since the Asian financial 
crisis, though most of them remain relatively small by international standards. However, there 
is little likelihood that AEC2015 will result in large changes in these markets.  
The first pillar also contains a relatively large number of measures related to 12 priority 
integration sectors (agro-based goods, air transport, automotive products, e-ASEAN, 
electronics and electrical goods, fisheries, health care services, rubber-based goods, textiles 
and clothing, tourism, logistics services and wood-based products; ASEAN Secretariat 2012, 
p. 7), as well as food, agriculture, and forestry. Japanese firms and products are important 
competitors in many of these industries, for example electronics and electrical goods, 
automotive products, tourism, and logistic services. However, because trade in electronics and 
electrical goods is already relatively unrestricted, the effects of these efforts are likely to be 
largest in automotive goods, tourism, and logistics. Because automotive goods and logistics 
are important to the Northern Kyushu economy, we will focus on these and a few other 
industries when examining the potential effects of AEC2015 on the region in the next section. 
 
5. AEC2015 and Industries in Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki 
The previous sections emphasize that AFTA has not resulted in large increases of 
intra-regional policy biases or in shares of intra-regional trade, and that AEC2015 is similarly 
unlikely to create large intra-regional policy biases. However, in sectors like automobiles and 
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logistics, there is a potential for AEC2015 to have relatively large effects, especially if 
AEC-related measures gradually become more effective after 2015, as expected by many 
analysts. What are the implications for industries in Kitakyushu and Shimoseki?  
The first step to answering this question is to realize that a relatively few, large 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) account for a very large portion of all transactions between 
Japan and ASEAN. For example, sales by affiliates of Japanese MNEs operating in the largest 
ASEAN-6 economies were 1.8 times larger than imports of those economies from Japan in 
1995, and because sales of those affiliates subsequently grew much more rapidly than imports 
from Japan, this ratio rose to 3.4-fold in 2005 and 4.0-fold in 2012 (Table 5).9 Sales by 
affiliates in ASEAN were much (15 times) larger than sales by affiliates in China in 1995 but 
the sales by affiliates in China grew relatively rapidly thereafter and were roughly equal to 
sales by affiliates in ASEAN in 2010-2011.10 Within ASEAN, affiliates in Singapore had by 
the largest sales in 1995 and 2005, but sales by affiliates in Thailand became largest in 2012. 
Affiliates in these two economies accounted for roughly two-thirds of sales by all affiliates in 
ASEAN (69-71% in 1995 and 2005, and 64-67% in 2010-2012). Sales by affiliates in the four 
smaller economies (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) are so small that Japan, Ministry of 
                                                  
9 Because sales of MNE affiliates are measured on a fiscal year basis and imports from Japan on a calendar year 
basis, these ratios are not precise. However, these data clearly show affiliate sales to be larger much larger than 
imports for these six economies combined and that affiliate sales have grown relatively rapidly. 
10 More recently, sales by affiliates in China fell sharply in 2012, largely because of increased political tensions 
between China and Japan. 
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Economy Trade and Industry (various years) does not report them.  
In 1995, manufacturing affiliates accounted for about half (52%) of affiliate sales in the 
ASEAN-6 and this share grew to about three-fifths (58-62%) in 2005 and thereafter (Table 5). 
Sales by trade affiliates, of which the vast majority (95% in 2012) is by wholesale trade 
affiliates, accounted for almost two-fifths of ASEAN-6 sales in 1995, but this share fell to 
36% in 2005 and 28-31% in 2010-2012. Sales by manufacturing affiliates in Thailand 
accounted for about one-quarter of all ASEAN-6 sales (24-28%) in recent years (2010-2012). 
Trade affiliates in Singapore (17-22% of the ASEAN-6 total) and manufacturing affiliates in 
Indonesia (12-14% of the total) were also large. This pattern contrasts to 1995 when 
Singapore trade affiliates (26% of the total) were largest, followed by manufacturing affiliates 
in Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia (13-15% of the total each). 
Although most ASEAN affiliates of Japanese MNEs buy most of their inputs in host 
ASEAN markets, it is also important to recognize that they buy and sell substantial 
proportions to Japanese parents and to other Japanese affiliates operating in ASEAN. For 
example, affiliates in the four largest developing economies in ASEAN (the ASEAN-4: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) bought 65% of their inputs and sold 63% of their 
output during 2012 in the host ASEAN economy they were operating (Table 6).11Nonetheless, 
purchases from parents amounted to over half (52%) of the value of imports from Japan and 
                                                  
11 This discussion focuses on the ASEAN-4 because the data source groups Singapore with Korea and Taiwan, 
and provides no similar data for Brunei or the CLMV economies. 
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imports from other Japanese firms were 7% of imports from Japan. In other words, about 
three fifths of the ASEAN-4’s imports from Japan were purchased by affiliates of Japanese 
MNEs operating in these economies. Moreover, about two-fifths of the purchases from local 
firms in the ASEAN-4 were made from other Japanese affiliates operating in the same local 
economy. Sales to Japanese parents and other Japanese firms in the same local economy were 
smaller than corresponding purchases, but still substantial. On the other hand, sales to firms in 
the local economy, mainly Japanese firms and local firms, but also to other foreign firms, 
were larger than corresponding purchases from these groups.  
Affiliates in transport machinery manufacturing (mainly automotive goods), followed by 
affiliates in wholesale trade and electric and electronic machinery manufacturing, were by far 
the largest, these three industries accounting for 72% of all purchases and 68% of all sales by 
ASEAN-4 affiliates (Table 6). The combined shares of these three industries in purchases 
from Japan (80%) and Japanese parents (81%) were even larger. In short, intra-firm trade by 
MNEs in these three industries is a very large portion of Japan’s trade with the ASEAN-4. 
Correspondingly, if AEC2015 is to have a large impact on transactions with Japan, it will be 
through its effects on the behavior of the large MNEs that dominate these industries and their 
networks with smaller Japanese firms.  
According to Toyo Keizai (2014), in 2013 there were only 18 Japanese MNE parents 
with affiliates abroad in which the parent had ownership shares of 20% or more with 
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headquarters in Kitakyushu and two in Shimonoseki (Table 7). Nine of the Kitakyushu firms 
are manufacturers and five of them are rather large, having over 1,000 employees each. These 
nine firms employ at least 14,646 workers, which is about one quarter of the 53,984 workers 
in manufacturing plants in Kitakyushu in 2012 (Table 8). However, most of the large firms 
have plants in several locations, and many of the parent employees reported in Table 8 
probably work outside Kitakyushu, and many also probably work in non-manufacturing 
plants. Employment data are only available for three of the nine non-manufacturers in 
Kitakyushu and neither of the two Shimonoseki firms.12 
The nine Kitakyushu manufacturers have investments in 78 affiliates abroad, 49 in 
manufacturing and 29 in non-manufacturing. Only 13 of these are located in ASEAN, 8 in 
manufacturing and 5 in non-manufacturing. Nine of the 13 ASEAN affiliates, 7 of which are 
involved manufacturing are controlled by two relatively large firms, Toto and Mitsui 
High-Tec. Yaskawa Electric is another large firm with presence in ASEAN, but it has only one 
non-manufacturing affiliate in the region and 11 manufacturing affiliates and 3 
non-manufacturers in other regions. Krosaki Harima is the other large firm with substantial 
foreign presence (13 manufacturers and 5 non-manufacturers) but none of these are in 
                                                  
12 According to Kyushu Economic Research Center (2014), there are several other Kitakyushsu and Shimonseki 
firms with presence in ASEAN and other regions. For example, this source reports Sankyu to be another large 
Kitakyushu-based transportation firm with 8 affiliates reported in ASEAN and 25 worldwide, but Toyo Keizai 
(2014) and the firm’s home page list its headquarters as Tokyo, though it does have strong historical ties to 
Kitakyushu (as does Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metals [especially the former Nippon Steel], for example).  
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ASEAN. Together these four large manufacturers have 69 of the 78 affiliates controlled by 
manufacturers. Relatively small non-manufacturers have concentrated their affiliates in 
ASEAN (which was the location of 9 of their 16 affiliates) to a much greater degree than the 
manufacturers. However, all of their ASEAN affiliates belonged to only four firms, Takada, 
Nitco Business Solutions, Toyo, and Ikeda Kogyo.  
As mentioned above, AEC2015 prioritizes liberalization of trade in automotive goods, 
and a large portion of ASEAN trade utilizing intra-regional preferences is related to autos and 
parts.13 Thus, AEC2015 might be expected to have relatively large impacts on the three 
Toyota Motor Kyushu factories and two Nissan Motor Kyushu factories that operate in the 
greater Kitakyushu region. However, these factories concentrate on the production of 
high-end vehicles and parts, not for on the relatively low-end vehicles and parts that dominate 
the ASEAN market. Thus, the direct effect of AEC2015 may be weak on these factories as 
well. In short, although Japan’s large MNEs and their Japanese suppliers in ASEAN are more 
likely to be affected by AEC2015 than other Japanese firms, these MNEs appear to have a 
relatively small presence in Kitakyushu and Shimoseki compared to other regions of Japan.  
The second step to understanding the effects of AEC2015’s potential in Kitakyushu and 
Shimonoseki is to understand that effects may be relatively large in services’ industries that 
                                                  
13 For example, of the 15 largest 6-digit HS categories of Thai preferential exports to AEC economies in 2012, 
six were auto-related and they accounted for over half of the export value for the top 15 categories combined 
(Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich 2015, p.68). 
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support trade and manufacturing in ASEAN. According to the 2012 economic census, 
employment in four key supporting service industries (information & communication, 
transport & post, trade [including retail], finance & insurance, and research & technical 
services) was double or more that of manufacturing employment in both cities (Table 8). Of 
course, a large number of these jobs serve only local customers and are unlikely to be affected. 
However, a substantial portion are related to trade through ports in the region and to the 
activities of Japanese MNEs abroad. It is very difficult to evaluate just how large the indirect 
effects on these industries will be, but they may well be larger than the direct effects on the 
manufacturing MNEs involved in ASEAN.  
Here it is important to consider how production networks involving Japanese MNEs and 
other firms operating in Japan, China, and ASEAN, for example, affect Japan. For example, if 
one calculates the ratio of the domestic value added (gross exports less related intermediate 
purchases) embodied in Japan’s exports to the gross value of those exports (including related 
intermediate purchases), the ratio fell from 93% in 1995 to 85% in 2009 for exports to the 
world and to ASEAN, with a similar decline for exports to China (Table 9). Because the 
majority of value added is also accounted for by wage income and profits, the domestic value 
added measure provides a much better estimate of the value of exports that accrues to 
Japanese workers and firms than the gross export measure.14 And because Japan produces 
                                                  
14 Value added is the value of gross output less the value of intermediate inputs or equivalently the wage 
payments plus profits (operating surplus) plus depreciation plus indirect taxes less subsidies. In the latter 
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relatively large portions of its intermediate inputs, its ratios for all industries combined were 
substantially higher than in many ASEAN-6 economies or China, for example.15  
The industry distribution of Japan’s domestic value added is markedly different than for 
gross exports. Most importantly, domestic value added is much smaller than gross exports for 
most manufacturing industries, especially in the three (general, electric and electronic, and 
transportation) machinery industries that accounted 68% of Japan’s gross exports to the world 
in 1995 and 57% in 2009; corresponding shares of domestic value added were only 35% and 
31%, respectively. Conversely, the shares of services industries in domestic value added (38% 
and 41%, respectively) were much larger than shares of gross exports (11% and 15%, 
respectively). Differences in the industry distributions of domestic value added and gross 
exports were similar for exports to the ASEAN-6 and China.  
The key point here is that the proliferation of production networks, which is particularly 
conspicuous in machinery industries, results in substantially lower domestic value added 
share for those machinery industries than in gross exports. In other words, workers and firms 
in services’ industries generate a much larger portion of the value added earned from exports 
than normally understood. This is also true transactions involving firms with a large 
                                                                                                                                                            
definition wage payments and profits are usually by far the biggest components. 
15 Reflecting high dependence on imported intermediate goods, these ratios were among the lowest in the region 
in both 1995 and 2009 in Singapore (53% and 50%, respectively), Malaysia (60% and 62%), the Philippines 
(69% and 62%), and Thailand (70% and 65%). In 1995-2009, corresponding ratios also fell sharply to low levels 
in China (from 88% to 67%) and Vietnam (76% to 63%). Ratios remained relatively high in Indonesia (85% and 
86%), reflecting relatively low import dependence. Data come from OECD-WTO (2013). 
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manufacturing presence in Kitakyushu such as Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metals, Toto, 
Yaskawa Electric, Toshiba, Toyota, and Nissan. Thus, to the extent that AEC2015 will have an 
influence on industries in Japan, Kitakyushu, and Shimonoseki, the influence will be much 
stronger in service industries than commonly perceived.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Section 2 first highlighted how ASEAN economies have performed relatively well over 
the last two decades, despite severe disruptions related to the Asian financial crisis, the 
Dot.com crash, and the World financial crisis. Performance has not been as stellar as China’s 
for example, but ASEAN has grown relatively rapidly to be a large market for Japanese firms 
and products. Section 3 also highlighted how ASEAN’s extra-regional and intra-regional trade 
have both grown quite rapidly, but intra-regional shares of ASEAN trade have not changed 
much since 2005. If one focuses on changes in intra-regional shares, and their relatively low 
levels, one might conclude that ASEAN and AFTA have not been very effective at promoting 
intra-regional trade. However, the most important economic causes of stagnant intra-ASEAN 
shares are (1) ASEAN’s strong comparative advantages relative to large extra-regional 
economic partners including Japan and (2) ASEAN’s relatively low unilateral barriers to trade, 
which make intra-regional preferences relatively unimportant.  
Will AEC2015 change these key economic factors that limit intra-regional shares? 
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Section 4 suggests that the simple answer is no; intra-regional shares of international 
transactions are likely to remain limited in ASEAN for the foreseeable future. Does that mean 
that AEC2015 is irrelevant? The more complicated and perhaps contradictory answer to that 
question is also no. AEC2015 is best viewed as another incremental step in ASEAN’s long 
path toward intra-regional economic and political integration and may have important impacts 
in a few key industries such as automotive goods and logistics. Section 5 also suggests that 
most effects will be felt by large MNEs and their suppliers, and that effects are likely to be 
larger in services’ industries than often perceived.  
On the other hand, as an economic and political organization, ASEAN is very likely to 
continue to become increasingly important for its members, Japan, and many other economies 
worldwide. In particular, ASEAN has been very successful in promoting conflict resolution, 
as well as the maintenance of peace and political dialogue among its members. This peace and 
political dialogue has also been a key necessary condition for the relatively good performance 
of the original five ASEAN economies since 1967, more recently ASEAN’s newer members. 
The ability of ASEAN to facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution is likely to continue to 
remain ASEAN’s most important political and economic contributions, especially in relation 
to territorial disputes involving Southeast Asia and maybe even Northeast Asia.  
Correspondingly, it is important for the national government and local governments in 
Japan to remain engaged with ASEAN and to help private firms and private sector 
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organizations such as Chambers of Commerce to be effective conduits for information about 
ASEAN, AEC2015, and related efforts to promote intra-regional integration. The most likely 
beneficiaries are likely to be in the AEC’s priority integration sectors such as automotive 
goods and logistics services. Because local governments cannot easily favor one firm or one 
industry over another, and because fiscal resources are limited in Japan, it is probably best to 
focus existing resources on information provision. Costs of such activity can be minimized by 
close coordination with Japan’s national agencies as well as with Japanese Chambers of 
Commerce and other, similar organizations operating in ASEAN.  
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Table 1: Alternative Measures of GDP in ASEAN, China, and Japan
Economy 1995 2005 2013 2015
At current US$ exchange rates (100 million US$)
ASEAN 6,598 9,262 24,104 26,655
 Brunei Darussalam 47 95 161 175
 Cambodia 34 63 155 184
 Indonesia 2,021 2,858 8,703 9,150
 Lao PDR 19 27 108 128
 Malaysia 888 1,435 3,132 3,756
 Myanmar - 138 568 736
 Philippines  821 1,031 2,721 3,303
 Singapore 879 1,274 2,979 3,202
 Thailand 1,680 1,764 3,873 3,975
 Vietnam 208 576 1,706 2,045
China 7,570 22,873 94,691 112,851
Japan 53,339 45,719 48,985 48,819
At current purchasing-power-parity exchange rates (100 million International $)
ASEAN 18,854 33,764 59,195 67,627
 Brunei Darussalam 169 244 300 337
 Cambodia 86 233 461 549
 Indonesia 8,212 13,012 23,890 27,444
 Lao PDR 67 147 316 377
 Malaysia 2,132 4,126 6,936 8,002
 Myanmar - 1,068 2,215 2,700
 Philippines  2,016 3,671 6,431 7,518
 Singapore 1,150 2,344 4,253 4,672
 Thailand 3,973 6,363 9,645 10,550
 Vietnam 1,050 2,557 4,750 5,479
China 21,956 64,563 161,491 192,303
Japan 28,557 38,585 46,676 49,168
At constant local currency (index, 2005=100)
 Brunei Darussalam 84 100 106 115
 Cambodia 45 100 171 196
 Indonesia 77 100 158 176
 Lao PDR 56 100 185 213
 Malaysia 63 100 145 161
 Myanmar - 100 179 210
 Philippines  67 100 151 170
 Singapore 60 100 156 166
 Thailand 76 100 131 138
 Vietnam 50 100 160 178
China 42 100 216 248
Japan 90 100 104 106
Notes: - = not available; 2013 data are estimates and 2015 data are forecasts; the 
ASEAN subtotal excludes Myanmar for 1995.
Source: International Monetary Fund (2014c).
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Table 2: Alternative Measures of Per Capita GDP in ASEAN, China, and Japan
Economy 1995 2005 2013 2015
At current US$ exchange rates (US$)
ASEAN 1,518 1,676 3,939 4,243
 Brunei Darussalam 16,478 26,587 39,659 41,833
 Cambodia 317 471 1,028 1,181
 Indonesia 1,038 1,291 3,510 3,587
 Lao PDR 386 469 1,594 1,824
 Malaysia 4,295 5,421 10,457 12,127
 Myanmar - 288 1,113 1,420
 Philippines  1,200 1,209 2,791 3,256
 Singapore 24,937 29,870 55,182 58,146
 Thailand 2,826 2,708 5,676 5,772
 Vietnam 289 700 1,902 2,233
China 625 1,749 6,959 8,211
Japan 42,516 35,781 38,468 38,522
At current purchasing-power-parity exchange rates (International $)
ASEAN 4,337 6,112 9,673 10,764
 Brunei Darussalam 58,698 68,004 73,823 80,335
 Cambodia 794 1,743 3,056 3,534
 Indonesia 4,217 5,877 9,635 10,759
 Lao PDR 1,381 2,543 4,666 5,357
 Malaysia 10,307 15,582 23,160 25,833
 Myanmar - 2,223 4,345 5,208
 Philippines  2,947 4,306 6,597 7,412
 Singapore 32,616 54,951 78,762 84,821
 Thailand 6,682 9,770 14,136 15,320
 Vietnam 1,459 3,103 5,295 5,983
China 1,813 4,938 11,868 13,993
Japan 22,763 30,198 36,654 38,797
At constant local currency (index, 2005=100)
 Brunei Darussalam 105 100 94 98
 Cambodia 56 100 151 169
 Indonesia 88 100 141 152
 Lao PDR 66 100 158 175
 Malaysia 81 100 128 138
 Myanmar - 100 168 195
 Philippines  84 100 132 143
 Singapore 72 100 124 128
 Thailand 84 100 125 131
 Vietnam 57 100 147 160
China 45 100 207 236
Japan 92 100 105 107
Notes: - = not available; 2013 data are estimates and 2015 data are forecasts; the ASEAN 
subtotal excludes Myanmar for 1995.
Source: International Monetary Fund (2014c).
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Importing Economy 1995 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN from World 3,673 5,829 9,615 11,683 12,443 13,043
 ratio to GDP, % 56% 63% 50% 53% 53% 54%
 Brunei Darussalam 30 16 31 64 65 85
 Cambodia 16 25 49 126 153 170
 Indonesia 406 577 1,357 1,774 1,917 1,866
 Lao PDR 6 13 36 46 63 73
 Malaysia 776 1,136 1,647 1,876 1,966 2,061
 Myanmar 23 36 99 137 170 203
 Philippines  283 474 602 662 679 680
 Singapore 1,244 2,002 3,109 3,661 3,800 3,731
 Thailand 805 1,181 1,851 2,291 2,515 2,500
 Vietnam 84 368 834 1,045 1,116 1,674
China from World 1,322 6,600 13,962 17,435 18,184 19,503
Japan from World 3,363 5,152 6,941 8,550 8,860 8,323
ASEAN from Japan 861 813 1,176 1,279 1,372 1,176
 Brunei Darussalam 3 1 2 2 2 2
 Cambodia 1 1 2 2 3 2
 Indonesia 92 69 170 194 228 193
 Lao PDR 0 0 1 1 2 1
 Malaysia 212 166 207 214 202 179
 Myanmar 2 1 3 6 14 12
 Philippines  63 81 74 72 71 57
 Singapore 263 192 245 262 236 204
 Thailand 216 260 383 423 499 410
 Vietnam 9 41 90 104 116 116
China from Japan 290 1,004 1,767 1,946 1,778 1,623
ASEAN from ASEAN 659 1,419 2,326 2,740 2,877 2,906
(% of total imports) 18% 24% 24% 23% 23% 22%
 Brunei Darussalam 15 11 18 26 28 37
 Cambodia 12 8 17 72 90 97
 Indonesia 60 170 389 511 537 539
 Lao PDR 3 10 26 34 45 46
 Malaysia 135 283 446 522 549 549
 Myanmar 10 18 43 55 63 82
 Philippines  30 89 169 157 155 148
 Singapore 277 521 746 782 798 779
 Thailand 93 216 307 372 406 416
 Vietnam 24 93 164 209 208 213
China from ASEAN 99 750 1,543 1,925 1,957 1,989
Japan from ASEAN 484 726 1,010 1,249 1,292 1,177
Table 3: Imports from the World, Japan, and ASEAN in ASEAN, Japan and China 
(importing economy estimates, US$100 millions)
Source: Asian Development Bank (various years); International Monetary Fund (2014a, 
2014c).
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Source: World Trade Organization (2014).
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MFN Applied Tariff Rates  Imports by Tariff Rate
Country Year Low Moderate High Year Low Moderate High
 Brunei Darussalam 2006 86 14 0 na na na na
2011 87 13 0 na na na na
 Cambodia 2006 6 78 17 2004 6 83 11
2012 16 78 6 2011 24 72 5
 Indonesia 2006 65 35 0 2005 80 18 2
2013 68 32 1 2012 80 19 2
 Lao PDR 2005 59 38 3 na na na na
 Malaysia 2006 64 28 8 2004 86 8 6
2013 73 23 4 2012 85 12 4
 Myanmar 2006 70 30 1 na na na na
2013 69 30 1 na na na na
 Philippines  2006 63 37 1 2005 87 12 2
2013 62 38 1 2012 82 14 4
 Singapore 2006 100 0 0 2005 100 0 0
2013 100 0 0 2012 100 0 0
 Thailand 2006 64 26 10 2005 73 23 4
2013 66 22 12 2012 73 22 5
 Vietnam 2006 53 15 32 na na na na
2013 58 38 4 2012 63 36 1
China 2006 27 71 2 2005 66 33 1
2013 26 73 1 2012 68 32 0
Japan 2006 82 18 0 2005 88 11 0
2013 82 18 0 2012 93 7 0
Note: Low tariffs rates are defined as rates of 5% or less; high rates are defined as rates 
above 25%; moderate rates are greater than 5% and less than or equal to 25%.
Source: World Trade Organizaion (various years).
Table: 4: Percentages of Non-Agricultural Tariff Lines and Imports with Low, 
Moderate, and High Tariff Rates
35
Host economy, industry 1995 2005 2010 2011 2012
ASEAN, 6 largest, all industries 1,547 2,774 3,914 4,380 5,408
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 181% 343% 335% 345% 400%
  Manufacturing 809 1,602 2,409 2,565 3,250
  Trade or wholesale trade 597 1,001 1,099 1,350 1,554
  Services 65 17 173 190 221
Indonesia, all industries 174 370 658 790 918
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 188% 536% 388% 407% 403%
  Manufacturing 126 281 513 597 652
  Trade or wholesale trade 11 62 101 121 158
  Services 2 4 1 4 3
Malaysia, all industries 236 312 404 413 404
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 111% 187% 195% 193% 200%
  Manufacturing 201 264 285 285 296
  Trade or wholesale trade 25 26 44 46 51
  Services 2 1 50 54 35
Philippines, all industries 42 136 195 224 264
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 66% 168% 263% 313% 372%
  Manufacturing 37 116 146 172 188
  Trade or wholesale trade 1 11 7 7 8
  Services 0 1 1 2 3
Singapore, all industries 692 1,021 1,005 1,345 1,507
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 263% 530% 411% 513% 637%
  Manufacturing 210 258 262 306 434
  Trade or wholesale trade 406 693 655 949 973
  Services 60 6 18 12 11
Thailand, all industries 403 882 1,513 1,446 2,098
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 186% 339% 395% 342% 420%
  Manufacturing 233 634 1,083 1,060 1,483
  Trade or wholesale trade 154 208 282 221 355
  Services 1 5 103 117 168
Vietnam, all industries 0.4 54 138 161 217
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 4% 132% 153% 155% 187%
  Manufacturing 0.1 48 120 145 197
  Trade or wholesale trade - 1 10 6 9
  Services - 0 0 1 1
China 103 2,109 3,957 4,360 3,477
 ratio to imports from Japan, % 36% 210% 224% 224% 196%
  Manufacturing 78 1,133 2,381 2,665 2,412
  Trade or wholesale trade 17 877 1,385 1,445 835
  Services 1 11 34 60 59
Sources: Japan,Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (various years); Table 3.
Table 5: Sales of Japanese MNE Affilitates Operating in ASEAN's 6 largest economies 
and China (US$100 millions and ratios in %, fiscal years beginning 1 April)
Notes: - = not available (too few firms to disclose); trade includes wholesale and retail 
trade for 1995, wholesale trade only for other years; ASEAN totals for trade and 
services in 1995 exclude very small sales (<0.22) by affiliates in Vietnam.
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From/to Japan From/to local markets  From/to
Purchases or sales, industry
Parent 
firms
Other 
firms
Japan 
firms
Local 
firms
Other 
firms
other 
markets
Purchases, all industries 523.9 65.4 721.0 913.9 83.3 343.1
ratios to imports from Japan, % 52% 7% 72% 91% 8% 34%
 Chemicals & non-metallic mineral pr. 19.3 5.4 13.4 48.2 1.3 41.3
 Basic metals & metal products 39.5 6.0 18.3 46.4 2.0 16.9
 General machinery 17.7 1.2 4.1 27.9 0.6 4.1
 Electric & electronic machinery 58.9 17.2 68.2 47.0 15.0 83.1
 Transport machinery 272.2 18.3 370.3 378.7 8.0 83.1
 Other manufacturing 14.7 5.1 20.8 50.3 4.9 21.2
 Construction 1.2 0.4 11.2 48.1 0.3 0.2
 Wholesale trade 92.0 11.7 207.0 62.2 18.4 84.4
 Services 3.4 0.0 2.3 174.2 2.3 0.4
 Other non-manufacturing 5.0 0.3 5.4 30.9 30.7 8.5
Sales, all industries 390.3 42.3 1,132 1,053 151.2 915.2
 Chemicals & non-metallic mineral pr. 17.9 3.2 58.2 77.5 1.7 62.5
 Basic metals & metal products 15.7 13.2 91.7 24.3 5.9 27.9
 General machinery 12.5 1.0 21.2 37.9 0.2 15.3
 Electric & electronic machinery 147.4 13.3 89.6 44.3 15.9 136.0
 Transport machinery 87.6 2.1 527.9 386.7 28.0 466.0
 Other manufacturing 58.9 5.8 36.6 43.2 3.7 37.8
 Construction 1.2 0.4 11.2 48.1 0.3 0.2
 Wholesale trade 20.7 1.9 178.6 214.9 19.1 135.9
 Services 14.5 0.3 35.5 145.5 11.1 3.0
 Other non-manufacturing 13.9 1.1 81.2 30.6 65.3 30.4
Sources: Japan,Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (various years); Table 3.
Table 6: Purchases & sales of Japanese MNEs in the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand) by Transaction Partner, Region, and Industry, 2012 
(US$100 millions and ratios in %, fiscal years beginning 1 April)
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Table 7: Japanese MNE parents with headquarters in Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki, their equity, employees, and affilliates abroad by location in 2013
Parent industry, equity (US$), 
and employees (number)  
Manufacturing 
affiliates (number)  
Non-manufacturing 
affiliates (number)
Location, parent firm Industry Equity Employees World ASEAN World ASEAN
KITAKYUSHU Manufacturing subtotal 904,897 >14,646 49 8 29 5
 OHISHI SANGYO CO.,LTD.  Paper products 4,764 341 0 0 3 2
 ZENRIN CO.,LTD.  Printing, publishing 67,031 2,022 0 0 2 0
 Shinryo Corporation  Chemicals 5,111 - 1 0 1 0
 HAMADA HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.  Ferrous metals 3,333 - 1 1 0 0
 KROSAKI HARIMA CORPORATION  Non-metallic mineral products 56,604 1,192 13 0 5 0
 TOTO LTD.  Non-metallic mineral products 363,719 6,982 15 4 10 1
 EIM ELECTRIC CO.,LTD.  General machinery 889 - 0 0 1 0
 YASKAWA Electric Corporation  Electric machinery 235,760 2,731 11 0 4 1
 Mitsui High-tec,Inc.  Electric machinery 167,686 1,378 8 3 3 1
KITAKYUSHU Non-manufacturing subtotal 49,356 >3,389 0 0 16 9
 TAKADA CORPORATION  Construction 37,232 1,685 0 0 3 3
 Daikou Co.,Ltd.  Wholesale trade 245 - 0 0 1 0
 FUJI BOEKI CO.,LTD.  Wholesale trade 981 193 0 0 2 0
 K.K.Fusho Art  Wholesale trade 0 - 0 0 1 0
 Nitco Business Solutions Co.,Ltd.  Wholesale trade 204 - 0 0 3 2
 TOYO CORPORATION  Wholesale trade 460 - 0 0 1 1
 Ikeda Kogyo Co.,Ltd.  Shipping 1,022 1,511 0 0 3 3
 Tsurumaru Shipping Co.,Ltd.  Shipping 2,045 - 0 0 1 0
 WORLDINTEC CO., LTD.  Business services 7,166 - 0 0 1 0
SHIMONOSEKI All industries, subtotal 115,120 - 1 1 1 0
 Hayashikane Sangyo Co.,Ltd.  Food & beverages manufact. 34,911 - 1 1 0 0
 HARAKOSAN CO.,LTD.  Real estate 80,209 - 0 0 1 0
Source: Toyo Keizai (2014); International Monetary Fund (2014b).
Notes: Data refer to parents with affiliates in which they had a 20% or greater equity share in October 2013. 
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Kitakyushu Shimonoseki
Industry Plants
Employ-
ees Sales Plants
Employ-
ees Sales
All industries 34,767 360,558 - 10,219 92,288 - 
 Primary industries 43 469 0.26 56 783 0.82
 Secondary industries 5,224 88,277 - 1,587 22,942 - 
  Mining 20 154 0.59 3 9 0.07
  Construction 3,374 32,703 - 942 6,511 - 
  Manufacturing 1,819 53,984 221.00 634 16,103 58.58
  Utilities 31 1,590 - 11 328 - 
 Tertiary industries (services) 29,500 271,812 - 8,576 68,563 - 
  Information & communication 318 6,164 - 55 565 - 
  Transport & post 1,254 26,019 - 281 6,911 - 
  Wholesale & retail trade 9,672 71,155 253.71 2,990 19,238 58.28
  Financial & insurance 650 9,759 - 215 3,851 - 
  Real estate & rental 2,911 9,272 19.01 664 2,050 3.13
  Research & technical services 1,325 9,149 11.63 319 1,637 3.05
  Accommodation & restaurants 4,261 27,226 11.79 1,144 7,579 3.60
  Lifestyle & recreation 3,164 14,375 20.57 946 3,376 4.02
  Educational services 918 10,615 - 309 2,046 - 
  Medical services 2,780 53,526 41.70 743 13,399 9.57
  Other services 2,247 34,552 - 910 7,911 - 
Note: - = not available or not disclosed.
Sources: Japan, Statistics Bureau (2014), International Monetary Fund (2014b). 
Table 8: Number of establishments and employees and value of sales or revenue (US$100 
millions) by industry in Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki, 2012
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Table 9: Japan's Domestic Value Added in Exports and Gross Exports by Source Industry and Desitination (US$100 millions)
World ASEAN-6  China
Value Added  Gross Exports Value Added  Gross Exports  Value Added  Gross Exports
Industry 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009  1995 2009 1995 2009
JAPAN, ALL INDUSTRIES 4,377 5,266 4,698 6,180 631 620 676 730 223 1,058 241 1,255
 ratio, value added/gross exports, % 93% 85% - - 93% 85% - - 92% 84% - - 
 Manufacturing 2,570 2,896 4,152 5,225 380 335 613 609 142 655 232 1,198
  Chemicals & non-metallic mineral products 451 479 466 814 63 55 64 91 23 110 24 188
  Basic metals & metal products 355 481 299 583 59 65 60 92 25 107 32 135
  General machinery 301 334 606 666 46 38 93 76 20 84 43 172
  Electric & electronic machinery 818 671 1,575 1,499 127 84 243 191 43 153 82 336
  Transport machinery 423 608 994 1,341 50 53 118 116 7 107 17 235
  Other manufacturing 220 323 211 322 34 40 35 44 24 94 34 132
 Services 1,647 2,163 537 946 227 260 62 120 72 359 9 56
  Trade, hotels & restaurants 393 631 179 310 58 77 28 41 14 94 0 2
  Transport, storage, communication 371 687 260 513 47 88 27 71 14 100 5 35
  Financial intermediation 208 264 39 35 27 30 2 2 10 48 2 1
  Business services 595 492 52 80 84 55 5 5 29 101 2 19
  Other services 81 90 6 7 11 10 0 1 4 17 0 0
 Agriculture, mining, utiliites, construction 159 206 10 9 24 25 1 1 9 43 1 1
Source: OECD-WTO (2013).
Notes: gross exports are the sales value of exports; value added is an estimate of the domestic value added (sales less intermediate inputs) 
embodied in exports (see text for a detailed explanation).
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Appendix Table 1: Domestic Value Added Shares of Gross Exports by Exporting Industry and Export Market (percent)
World Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam China
Industry 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009
TOTAL 93 85 85 86 60 62 69 62 53 50 70 65 76 63 88 67
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 96 92 96 95 77 79 92 92 73 66 90 89 87 76 95 95
Mining and quarrying 96 88 95 96 71 74 82 87 44 .. 91 89 90 85 92 72
Food products, beverages and tobacco 92 90 93 91 72 75 86 91 63 49 86 84 79 64 92 75
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 91 86 77 76 59 62 51 71 60 46 76 74 50 37 86 79
Wood, paper, paper products, printing and publi 94 91 89 85 77 78 69 80 70 59 69 68 75 58 88 65
Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products 90 79 79 85 60 66 57 64 43 44 68 67 59 48 87 59
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 89 81 80 84 50 51 64 61 62 49 68 63 48 36 88 65
Machinery and equipment, nec 95 89 60 61 45 44 56 65 66 44 66 56 54 45 86 63
Electrical and optical equipment 92 82 67 72 43 44 49 50 42 39 53 45 46 36 87 57
Transport equipment 95 86 79 83 53 53 50 66 75 56 62 55 53 43 88 67
Manufacturing nec; recycling 92 86 73 86 55 55 71 78 62 49 70 65 53 42 88 76
Electricity, gas and water supply 93 .. 88 84 70 73 .. .. 77 57 89 90 .. .. .. 75
Construction .. .. .. 83 67 69 77 .. 76 62 74 73 .. .. 90 74
Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurant 97 95 93 92 82 82 86 92 78 68 93 93 80 72 92 91
Transport and storage, post and telecommunicati 94 93 89 84 62 64 74 77 65 47 78 75 75 67 93 83
Financial intermediation 96 97 92 96 81 84 92 92 77 73 96 95 85 81 93 94
Business services 98 96 91 87 73 75 87 90 71 59 90 88 83 77 90 89
Other services 98 95 88 87 79 78 89 .. 85 77 82 80 84 79 90 83
Source: OECD-WTO (2013).
Notes: .. = gross exports = 0; gross exports are measured as sales value; value added are adjusted measures of sales less intermediate inputs (see text 
for explanation).
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